Do Monetary Handcuffs Restrain Leviathan? Fiscal Policy in Extreme Exchange Rate Regimes

This paper studies fiscal policy in countries that have chosen an extreme monetary stance. We think of a country as having an extreme monetary policy if it is in either a currency board or a common currency area. In much of our analysis, we distinguish between multilateral currency unions (such as the East Caribbean Currency Area, or ECCA) and countries that have unilaterally adopted the currency of an anchor country (such as Panama).

It is possible to motivate our analysis in several ways. A number of countries are considering whether to abandon national monetary sovereignty and unilaterally adopt the money of another country, including Mexico and Argentina; Ecuador, Guatemala, and El Salvador are already proceeding with dollarization. In Europe, 12 countries have already abandoned national monetary discretion within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). More generally, there has been much discussion of the “disappearing center” of exchange rate regimes; countries are said to have a choice of either freely floating or going to an extreme monetary stance.

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The real effects of monetary policy in the European Union: what are the differences?

The advent of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) scheduled for the beginning of 1999 has sparked off a debate about the best way of conducting monetary policy in the euro area. One dimension of this discussion concerns the preferred framework for conducting monetary policy-that is, about whether the European Central Bank (ECB) ought to target inflation, monetary aggregates, or the exchange rate. A second is about differences in the effects of changes in monetary policy on activity in different EU countries, related to differences in the transmission mechanism.

Opinions have tended to be divided on the question of the preferred monetary policy framework for the euro area, although recently, there appears to be a consensus emerging in favor of informal inflation targeting, accompanied by monitoring of monetary aggregates and other indicators. In any event, policy discussions have in general tended to focus less on questions relating to the real effects of monetary policy in the EU than on the issue of the appropriate framework for conducting monetary policy in the euro area. This may be partly due to the fact that many of the issues pertaining to identification of the monetary transmission mechanism tend to be econometric rather than economic. Nevertheless, a proper understanding of possible differences in the effects of changes in monetary policy on activity among the EU countries is crucial for an appreciation of the difficulties that may arise from the implementation of a unified monetary policy throughout the euro area. And this issue is the main focus of the paper.

» Read more: The real effects of monetary policy in the European Union: what are the differences?

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Independent Review of the Operation of Monetary Policy in New Zealand

In May 2000, the Government announced that the New Zealand monetary policy framework would be reviewed. Professor Lars Svensson of Stockholm University was appointed to undertake the review and to report by the end of February 2001. Professor Svensson’s report was released by the Treasurer/Minister of Finance on 28 February.

In this issue of the Bulletin, we have published the Executive Summary and recommendations of the Svensson Report, together with the terms of reference of the review. The complete report by Professor Svensson can be obtained from the New Zealand Treasury and can be accessed on www.monpolreview.govt.nz – the monetary policy review website, and on www.rbnz.govt.nz – the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s website.

» Read more: Independent Review of the Operation of Monetary Policy in New Zealand

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